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Gas Flaring in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta: Failed 







 This Note examines the use of litigation to stop gas flaring in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta, and proposes an alternative solution to the ongoing gas 
flaring in the Niger Delta region.  In exploring an alternative solution, this 
Note (1) details the history of gas flaring in Nigeria; (2) discusses Nigeria’s 
gas-flaring legislation and its implementation; (3) analyzes the impact that 
landmark gas flaring cases have had on the stoppage of gas flaring; and 
(4) details how litigation has been used as a tool to combat gas flaring, 
juxtaposing the concept of the rule of law.  This Note concludes by 
suggesting that other solutions should be explored in combating the gas 
flaring problem in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. 
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Over the past few decades, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has been 
the focus of climate change issues.  The climate change discussion began 
after environmental pollution associated with oil production in the Niger 
Delta region burgeoned and became part of the global discussion.  Oil 
production companies, such as Shell, have engaged in methods that have 
disregarded human lives and the environment during their oil-drilling 
process.  Thus, the Niger Delta ecosystem changed drastically once Shell 
arrived in the area in the 1950s.  
One of the devastating consequences of oil drilling in the Niger Delta 
region is gas flaring.  As crude oil is extracted from the ground, associated 
gases are released.  These associated gases are called gas flares.  The 
Nigerian government has unsuccessfully attempted to battle the gas-flaring 
issue.  These attempts have been unsuccessful because of the government‘s 
favoritism toward Shell.  
To draw more attention to the issue, Niger Delta citizens, like the 
plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA,
1
 have attempted to use the courts and 
litigation to address the issue of climate change.  In particular, Niger Delta 
citizens have focused on stopping gas flaring.  This essay focuses on the 
role of the Nigerian courts in gas-flaring litigation and the use of litigation 
as a tool to stop gas flaring.   
Part II gives a brief history of Nigeria and an introduction to gas 
flaring.  Part III focuses on gas-flaring legislation and its implementation.  
Furthermore, Part III discusses the impact of the Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum 
Development Co.
2
 case in stopping gas flaring in the Niger Delta region.  
Part IV discusses how litigation has been used as a tool to combat gas 
flaring and how the concept of the rule of law applies to gas-flaring 
litigation; apropos of gas-flaring legislation, a comparison is also drawn 
between the Kenule Saro-Wiwa case and the Gbemre case.  Part V suggests 
an alternative way to stop gas flaring.  Part VI summarizes the conclusion 
of this paper.  
This paper establishes that litigation has not been an effective tool to 
stop gas flaring: rather than applying the rule of law, Nigerian courts have 
applied rule by corporation.  Given that the Nigerian courts are highly 
                                                 
 1.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (holding that if the EPA 
makes a "judgment" that greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change, the EPA 
has to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases unless it provides some reasonable 
explanation as to why it cannot or will not do so). 
 2.  Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co., [2005] No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, at 29–30 
(F.H.C.) (Nigeria), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/case-documents/nigeria/ni-
shell-nov05-judgment.pdf (holding that the Nigerian Constitutional right to life includes the 
right to a clean, pollution-free environment and that Shell‘s failure to halt gas flares violates 
said right). 
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influenced by the government, which in turn is influenced by oil 
companies, a possible solution may be to allow Niger Delta communities to 
both promulgate gas-flaring laws and arbitrate gas-flaring matters.  This 
customary arbitration approach may be a more effective tool to stopping 
gas flaring because customary arbitrators are free from Shell‘s undue 
influence and have been long commited to stopping gas flaring.  At this 
juncture, it is important to give a brief discussion of the Nigerian political 
and judicial climate.   
II. Brief History of the Nigerian Economy and Gas Flaring 
 
This section presents a brief introduction to Nigeria, which is relevant 
to understanding the idiosyncrasies of gas-flaring legal regulation in 
Nigeria.  Part A presents a detailed introduction to the Nigerian economic 
climate and its oil economy, shedding light on how mismanagement of 
Nigeria‘s natural resources may also be a contributing factor to the 
government‘s inability to stop gas flaring.  Part B discusses gas flaring in 
Nigeria and its impact on the environment and human lives.    
A. History of Nigeria 
 
Nigeria, the most populated African country, is located in West Africa 
with a population of about 120 million people.
3
  Nigeria‘s natural resources 
include crude oil, gold, cotton, yams, rubber, hides, and skins.
4
  
Notwithstanding the fact that Nigeria sits on diverse natural resources, 
Nigeria still has a very weak economy, with a GDP per capita (nominal) of 
about $2,400 (2009 estimate) and approximately 70% of the population 
living below the poverty level.
5
  These economic statistics substantiate the 
claim of government mismanagement of natural resources.  
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa with most of the oil-
producing land located in the Niger Delta region.
6
  Shell, one of the largest 
oil producers in Nigeria, first discovered crude oil in Nigeria in the 1950s.
7
  
                                                 
 3.  KENNETH OMEJE, HIGH STAKES AND STAKEHOLDERS:  OIL CONFLICT AND SECURITY 
IN NIGERIA 25 (2006).  
 4.  See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook:  Nigeria (2010), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html (last visited Nov. 
14, 2010) (listing some of Nigeria's natural resources) (on file with the Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  See OMEJE, supra note 3, at 31 ("Nigeria's total proven reserves of oil are 
estimated to be 34 billion barrels (onshore and offshore), mostly in the [Niger] Delta area.") 
(citations omitted). 
 7.  See id. at 33 (describing the first commercial discovery of crude oil in Nigeria in 
May 1956 by a joint venture of Shell and British Petroleum). 
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Under the name of Shell D‘Arcy, received exclusive exploration and 
prospecting rights for petroleum in Nigeria in 1937 and officially began 
drilling for oil in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta region in 1956.
8
  Crude-oil products 
that are produced in Nigeria are deemed the property of the federal 
government.
9
  Consequently, no private individual has a right to oil.
10
  
Today, Nigeria gains more than 70% of its revenue from oil exportation.
11
  
Despite the substantial revenue from oil production, Nigeria continues to 
suffer from the environmental degradation associated with oil production, 
and gas flaring continues to be the norm in the region.
12
  In fact, Nigeria is 
the world‘s second largest gas flarer.
13
  
The next part details the effects of gas flaring on the Niger Delta 
people with particular emphasis on Shell‘s gas-flaring practices.  The 
discussion of oil companies‘ practices will focus on Shell because Shell is 
the dominant oil company in Nigeria. 
B. Gas Flares 
 
One of the major problems associated with crude-oil production is gas 
flaring.  This part defines gas flaring, explains how gas flares are produced, 
and describes the impact of gas flares on the environment and on human 
lives.  This discussion illustrates how gas flaring adds to the problem of 
climate change and the importance of regulating gas flaring in Nigeria.  
                                                 
 8.  See IKE OKONTA, ORONTO DOUGLAS & GEORGE MONBIOT, WHERE VULTURES 
FEAST:  SHELL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA 23 (2003) (providing the 
history of Britain's interest in Nigerian oil and describing various ordinances related to 
Nigerian oil that were intended to benefit Shell). 
 9.  See Petroleum Act, (1990) Cap. 350, § 1, (Nigeria) available at 
http://www.nigeria-law.org/Petroleum Act.htm (vesting ownership and control of all 
petroleum in Nigeria in the state).   
 10.  See id. § 13 (making it an offense for any person to prospect, explore, or win or 
work petroleum without a license granted from the state under the act).   
 11.   See OMEJE, supra note 3, at 35 ("Oil revenue as a percentage of total national 
revenue has also grown from a less than 25 percent average in the 1960s to an average of 
more than 70 percent from the 1970s through the 1990s."). 
 12. Poison Fire (Vimeo 2008) available at http://poisonfire.org/poison-fire-movie 
(showing video testimonies from individuals in the Niger Delta on the environmental and 
community impacts of oil spills and gas flaring in the region). 
 13.  See Press Release, The Word Bank, Satellite Observations Show Declining Levels 
of Gas Flaring, Greenhouse Emissions (Nov. 17, 2009) available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/ (click "News" hyperlink then "Press Releases" and enter Nov. 16, 
2009 date) (reporting the results of a satellite study conducted by Global Gas Flaring 
Reduction which showed that Nigeria flares the second most gas of any country in the 
world). 
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Gas-flaring emissions contribute significantly to global warming.
14
  
They are produced when extra gases are burned off during the oil-drilling 
process.
15
  Gas flares are composed of toxic gases such as sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen dioxides, benzapryene, toluene, xylene, and hydrogen sulfide.
16
  
These gases, for example, methane and CO2, are released into the 




Gas flaring is harmful to human life and the environment.  Nigeria‘s 
Niger Delta residents observe visible gases oozing from oil-production 
sites.
18
  Alarmingly, these sites are located in the midst of villages and have 
become a modern addition to the Niger Delta landscape.
19
  Mr. Ebere 
Udeagu, a former deputy governor related the following: 
 
Gas flaring by oil companies in the oil producing communities 
has terribly devastated a substantial portion of farmlands leaving 
the streams polluted. These areas have been turned into ghettos 
and swamps with the indigenes becoming destitute in their 
fatherland. Their sources of livelihood, which is farming and 
                                                 
 14.  See BRUNO GERVET, GAS FLARING EMISSION CONTRIBUTES TO GLOBAL WARMING 
2, 10 (Mar. 2007), available at  
http://www.ltu.se/polopoly_fs/1.5035!gas%20flaring%20report%20-%20final.pdf 
(explaining that heat emissions explain 55% of global warming and concluding that the 
energy released by gas flaring in the last 120 years accounts for about 3% of missing heat 
generation).   
 15.  See Press Release, The World Bank, supra note 13 ("Flaring or burning of gas 
occurs to dispose of natural gas liberated during crude oil production and processing, most 
often in remote areas where there is no gas transportation infrastructure or local gas 
market.").  
 16.  THE CLIMATE JUSTICE PROGRAMME & ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACTION/FRIENDS 
OF THE EARTH NIGERIA, GAS FLARING IN NIGERIA:  A HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND 
ECONOMIC MONSTROSITY 24 (2005), available at 
http://www.climatelaw.org/media/cases/case-documents/nigeria/gas-flaring-in-nigeria.pdf 
[hereinafter THE CLIMATE JUSTICE PROGRAMME]. 
 17.  See NNIMMO BASSEY, GAS FLARING:  ASSAULTING COMMUNITIES, JEOPARDIZING 
THE WORLD 9–11 (Dec. 10, 2008) available at 
http://www.eraction.org/publications/presentations/gas-flaring-ncc-abuja.pdf (describing the 
harmful effects of gas flaring on the health of the people in the Niger Delta, on the economy 
of the region, and on the world because of gas flaring's relation to climate change). 
 18.  See Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Gas Flaring Disrupts Life in Oil-Producing Niger 
Delta (National Public Radio July 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12175714 (reporting that villagers see 
huge flames emitted from gas flaring sites and billows of black smoke that leap into the sky). 
 19.  See id. (describing the villages of Ebocha-Egbema, which are located in the heart 
of the Niger Delta and where gas flares loom over houses, farms, and shops). 
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fishing, have been closed as the streams have lost life, and the 




Unfortunately, the Niger Delta people‘s main occupation is farming 
and fishing.  Thus, gas flares not only have a devastating effect on the 
environment but also on their means of livelihood.  
Indeed, the addition of gas flares has not only been detrimental to the 
environment but also has changed life in the villages. Kenule Saro-Wiwa 
asserted the following: 
 
[There has been] a disruption of normal life in the village. The 
people have been used to having 12 hours of day and 12 hours of 
night. But now, their position is worse than that of the Eskimos in 
the North Pole for while nature gives the Eskimos six months of 
daylight followed by six months of night, Shell-BP has given 
Dere people about ten years of continuous daylight. There are no 
compensations for these inconveniences and there is nothing to 




Gas flaring in the Niger Delta region has also contributed to numerous 
diseases among the residents, such as asthma, bronchitis, cancer, blood 
disorders, and skin diseases; these diseases are directly correlated to gas 
flaring.
22
  As a result of these diseases "[l]ife expectancy in the Niger Delta 
is markedly lower [in comparison to other parts of Nigeria] . . . [the average 
age of death in the Niger Delta region] stands at about 40 years."
23
  These 
testimonials also suggest that large quantities of gases are flared in the 
Niger Delta region.  Although there is a dearth of sufficient data stipulating 
the exact amount of gas flaring in Nigeria, it has been reported that Nigeria 
flares about 75% of the gases it produces.
24
  Due to the high emission rate, 
the impact of the flared gases is substantial.  On a national and global scale, 
gas flares are a significant contributor to global warming and climate 
change.
25
  Thus, they not only affect the Niger Delta community but also 
                                                 
 20.  Eugenia Okpara, Imo Deputy Governor Laments Menace of Gas Flaring, DAILY 
TIMES OF NIGERIA, Nov. 27, 2003, available at 
http://news.biafranigeriaworld.com/archive/2003/nov/27/244.html. 
 21. KENULE SARO-WIWA, GENOCIDE IN NIGERIA:  THE OGONI TRAGEDY 78 (1992). 
 22.  See Bassey, supra note 17, at 9 (describing the health effects of gas flaring on the 
people in the Niger Delta region). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See THE CLIMATE JUSTICE PROGRAMME, supra note 16, at 11 (stating that "Nigeria 
currently flares 75% percent of the gas it produces").  
    25.  See BRONWEN MANBY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL:  CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA‘S OIL PRODUCING 
COMMUNITIES 66 (1999), available at 
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contribute to global greenhouse emissions.  In fact, Nigeria‘s gas flaring 
produces almost 25% of Africa‘s greenhouse gases.
26
  
However, gas flares, also known as associated gas, could be emitted in 
environmentally safe ways, including re-injecting them into the earth or 
using them as an energy source.
27
  While these alternative methods are 
practiced in countries like the United States, such environmentally safe 
methods are not practiced in Nigeria.  For example, a Niger Delta resident 
stated "[l]ed by oil giant Shell, [oil companies] have been burning gas for 
decades when they could be using it to provide energy to the local 
population.  The government must ensure that oil companies stop this 
destructive practice now."
28
  In fact, oil companies have continuously flared 
gas for nearly 50 years.
29
  Moreover, the local population is often left 
without electricity and has limited access to crude-oil products.
30
  This 
statement suggests that Shell‘s oil-production practices have been met with 
resentment by the Niger Delta community and that the Nigerian 
government has not effectively addressed the problem.  In sum, this section 
illustrates the detrimental effects of gas flaring and the alternatives to 
minimizing gas flaring.  The next section of this essay discusses ways in 
which the Nigerian government has attempted to combat gas flaring.  
III. Legal Framework 
 
In the early 1960s, the Nigerian government recognized gas flaring as 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0199.pdf  (noting that gas flaring is a 
significant contributor to greenhouse gases).    
     26.  See UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Should Stopping Gas Flaring 
be a Priority? (Sept. 3, 2008) available at 2008 WLNR 26858547 (ranking countries by 
greenhouse emission). 
 27.  See GULZHAN NURAKHMENT, GAS FLARING AND VENTING:  WHAT CAN 
KAZAKHSTAN LEARN FROM THE NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE? 5–7 (2006) available at  
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/car/html/CAR10_ARTICLE14.PDF (discussing 
environmentally safe alternatives  to gas flaring). 
 28.  Paula Palmer, Emergency Action: Stop Gas Flaring in Nigeria, Jan. 12, 2009, 
http://www.foei.org/en/media/archive/2009/nigeria-to-stop-companies-flaring-gas (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2010) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 29.  See Shell: Guilty of Climate Crimes, http://www.shellguilty.com/learn-
more/climate-crimes/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (detailing Shell‘s oil drilling activities in 
Nigeria) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment).  
      30.  See Paula Palmer, Mangrove Action Project, Niger Delta‘s Mangrove 
Communities Threatened by Continued Gas Flaring, Jan. 12, 2009, 
http://mangroveactionproject.org/news/action-alerts/niger-deltas-mangrove-communities-
threatened-by-continued-gas-flaring (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (noting that despite the fact 
that Nigeria‘s Niger Delta is endowed with crude oil, local residents have limited access to 
crude-oil by-products) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
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a potential problem associated with oil production.  Since then, the 
government has combated the gas flaring issue through legislation such as 
the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Gas Re-Injection Act.  Part A below 
discusses the enactment of gas-flaring legislation and its implementation, 
focusing on the major legislative events spanning from when Nigeria 
gained independence in the 1960s to the present.  This timeline is important 
in understanding the impediments to the stoppage of gas flaring.   
Part A concludes that Nigeria has not successfully halted gas flaring 
because of the petroleum ministry‘s lack of adequate enforcement.  In other 
words, the petroleum minister‘s favoritism toward Shell has rendered 
legislation on gas flaring meaningless.  Part B of this section analyzes the 
judicial response to gas flaring and concludes that Nigerian courts cannot 
be used as a forum for protesting gas-flaring issues until the judicial system 
is free from bias toward oil companies such as Shell.  If these practices 
persist, the current 2012 deadline for stopping gas flaring may only be 
symbolic. 
A. Laws Addressing Gas Flares in Nigeria 
 
The stoppage of gas flaring in Nigeria has not been successful because 
of the failure to enforce gas-flaring legislation.  The Petroleum Act of 1969 
was the first Act that addressed the general potential problem of oil 
production and its accompanying environmental hazards.
31
  This act 
encouraged oil companies to submit oil-development schemes that specified 
potential solutions to such environmental hazards.
32
   
In 1979, the Nigerian government made its first attempt to specifically 
address the issue of gas flaring by promulgating the Associated Gas Re-
Injection Act No. 99.
33
  Through this Act, the government mandated that oil 
companies "re-inject gas into the earth‘s crust and/or submit detailed plans 
for gas utilization."
34
  January 1, 1984 was set as the deadline to stop gas 
flaring; however, an oil company could be exempt from this deadline if 
they were issued a certificate from the petroleum minister.
35
  Major oil 
companies in Nigeria indicated difficulties in meeting the 1984 deadline, 
citing lack of resources to construct a gas-injection plant within the 
                                                 
 31.  See OMEJE, supra note 3, at 43 (detailing the history of the Nigerian‘s government 
attempt to combat gas flaring).  
     32. See id. at 45 (explaining the procedure implemented by the Nigerian government 
to stop gas flaring).  
     33.  See id. (observing the Nigerian government‘s success in developing a strategy to 
stop gas flaring).  
     34.  Id. at 45. 
    35.  See id. at 20 (stipulating that oil companies could be exempt from the January 1, 
1984 deadline if they obtained a certificate from the Nigerian petroleum minister).  





 consequently, the deadline was extended by one year.
37
  
However, oil companies failed to adhere to the policies stipulated in the 
1984 deadline, claiming it was too expensive to re-inject gas.
38
  
Consequently, approximately 55% of oil fields were exempted from 
participating in gas re-injection and an insignificant penalty was imposed 
on oil fields where gas flared.
39
  
By 2007, the "Nigerian department of Petroleum Resources . . . 
[reported that there were about] 117 flare sites in the Delta."
40
  Gas-flare 
practices continued to increase dramatically as oil companies deemed it less 
expensive to pay the minimal fines than to re-inject gas.  Consequently, 
about 75% of gas is flared, whereas approximately 12% is re-injected.
41
  
Although legislators promulgated a law to combat gas-flaring, gas flaring 
remains an issue because of inadequate enforcement due to low penalties 
imposed for violations and the granting of exemptions to oil companies that 
flare gas.  
B.  The Judicial Response to Gas Flaring 
 
Despite the laws governing gas flaring, gas flaring remains widely 
practiced in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta region.  Shell continues to flare gas and 
has been unable to provide a certificate from the petroleum minister, 
pursuant to the Re-injection Act, to show that it is not feasible to engage in 
gas re-injection.
42
  Until 2005, the petroleum minister remained silent on 
this issue, despite the fact that Shell has been unable to provide any 
evidence that it is flaring gas lawfully.
43
  Because the petroleum ministry 
                                                 
      36.  See id. (noting that oil companies were reluctant in complying with the 
government‘s mandate).  
      37.  See id. (observing the Nigerian government‘s willingness to  be accommodating to 
the needs of oil companies).  
 38.  See Yinka Omorogbe, Regulation of Oil Industry Pollution in Nigeria, in NEW 
FRONTIERS IN LAW 147–63 (Epiphany Azinge ed., Oliz 1993) (discussing the oil companies‘ 
inability to adhere to the proposed alternative to gas flaring). 
    39.  See id. (reporting the data on the percentage of  oil companies that were exempted 
from the mandatory gas re-injection program).  
 40.  See Sasha Chavkin, Shell Games in Nigeria, THE NATION (Jan. 4, 2010), available 
at http://www.thenation.com/article/shell-games-nigeria (reporting the 2007 data on gas 
flaring in Nigeria).  
 41.  See MBendi Information Services, Oil and Gas in Nigeria, 
http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/ng/p0005.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (noting that 
Nigeria is a member of OPEC and is its 12th largest producer) (on file with the Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 42.  See THE CLIMATE JUSTICE PROGRAMME, supra note 16, at 31 (reporting Shell‘s 
non-compliance with the gas flaring legislation).  
 43.  See Press Release, Climate Justice, Legal Action to Stop Nigerian Gas Flaring 
(June 20, 2005), available at http://climatelaw.org/media/2005Jun20/ (last visited Oct. 31, 
2010) (observing that Nigeria‘s petroleum minister failed to sanction Shell, despite Shell‘s 
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failed to combat gas flaring in Nigeria, Niger Delta citizens and residents 
have sought to use the Nigerian courts as a tool to stop gas flaring.  
This section will analyze the role the Nigerian courts have played in 
combating gas flaring.  On careful examination of Gbemre v. Shell 
Petroleum Development Co., this section concludes that the Nigerian courts 
have also failed to assume their role as impartial arbitrators in matters 
involving gas flaring.  If this attitude continues, gas flaring will persist, as 
the court will not be able to implement any stipulated gas-flaring deadline.  
Before delving into the discussion of how the Nigerian courts have 
handled gas-flaring cases, it is imperative to understand the courts‘ role.  
There are different theories of the courts‘ role in litigation; however, only a 
few theories that pertain to the Niger Delta issue will be discussed in this 
section.  One school of thought, led by Lon Fuller, presents the notion that 
the court‘s role is to arbitrate between individuals.
44
  Fuller‘s theory 
presents the traditional view that the court‘s role is limited to strictly 
resolving private rights disputes—disputes between private people.
45
   
Building on Fuller‘s model, Abram Chayes presented a model positing 
that the court is a tool for social change.
46
  In the second model, Chayes 
postulated that judges are "the creator and manager of complex forms of 
ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the 
court . . . .  [This model] require[s] the judge‘s [continuous] involvement in 
administration and implementation."
47
  Consequently, under the second 
model, the judge goes beyond reaching a judgment in the case, ensuring 
that the court redresses constructional rights violations.  In Chayes‘ model, 
the true goal of the plaintiff is to achieve success beyond the courtroom—
sending a political message:  a goal beyond the mere winning of a case.
48
   
After assessing these models, Professor Jules Lobel postulated a third 
model such that the courts could be used "as a forum of protests."
49
  In 
Lobel‘s model, the courts are deemed a "forum in which the struggle for 
                                                                                                                 
non-compliance with the gas flaring legislation) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, 
and the Environment). 
    44.  See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 479 (2004) 
("[T]he mainstream model [posited by Lon Fuller] views courts as arbiters of disputes 
between private individuals asserting particular rights.").  
    45.  See id. (establishing that the court‘s role is to resolve private rights).  
     46.  See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Introduction to the Symposium:  Complex 
Litigation:  Plagued by Concerns over Federalism, Jurisdiction and Fairness. 37 AKRON L. 
REV. 589, 590 (2004) (noting that by "the mid-1960‘s, the civil rights movement, judicial 
activism in the constitutional arena, and new liability standards created by statutes and courts 
lead to greater resort to the courts for social and economic problems"). 
      47.  Id. at 604 n.4 (citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–84 (1976)).  
      48.  See Lobel, supra note 44, at 479 (stating that Chayes model "emphasized the 
court‘s power to remedy structural, constitutional or statutory violations"). 
 49.  Id. at 479–80.  
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societal change occurs.  Even when public interest lawsuits prevail in 
courts, often their most lasting legacy is not the relief ordered by the court, 
but the lawsuit‘s contribution to the ongoing community discourse about an 
important public issue."
50
  The third model allows the court to mediate 
arguments on social justice issues such as climate change and 
environmental law matters.  This model merges the goals of the first two 
theories in that it allows individuals to raise claims in matters addressing 
community issues, and, in so doing, the plaintiff is able to send political 
messages to the community on important community issues, contributing to 
the discussions of ongoing community matters.  Lobel‘s theory thereby 
maximizes the role of the court in arbitrating matters in society.  
Not all scholars have accepted Lobel‘s model.  For example, Lobel‘s 
model arguably violates the United States Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11, which bars lawyers from bringing lawsuits for "improper purpose."
51
  
While this paper acknowledges that there are competing theories of the role 
of the courts, this essay focuses solely on the court as a forum for protest 
and a tool for social change.  The discussion of the court as a forum of 
protest and as a tool of social change is particularly relevant, given that the 
Nigerian government has failed to stop gas flaring over the past several 
decades.  Due to the Nigerian government‘s inability to stop gas flaring 
thus far, this discourse explores whether the Nigerian courts can help stop 
gas flaring in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta region.  Against this theoretical 
backdrop, this section will analyze the role of the Nigerian courts in gas-
flaring cases.  
In matters regarding gas flaring, Niger Delta plaintiffs have not been 
successful in using the court as a tool for social change in that the courts 
have not been able to implement and administer constitutional policy.  A 
court can only be used as a tool for social change when the court is 
impartial and willing to abide by its constitutional role as an unbiased 
arbitrator.  The Gbemre case illustrates an attempt to use the court as a 
forum for social change; however, this goal was not met because of the lack 
of a truly independent judiciary.  Jonah Gbemre, on behalf of the Iwherekan 
Community in Delta State, brought suit against Shell Petroleum 
Development on the grounds that Shell‘s gas-flare practices violated the 
fundamental rights of the people, which are guaranteed under sections 33(1) 
and 34(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights Act, Cap. A9, Volume 
1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
52
  Secondly, the plaintiff argued 
that Shell‘s failure to engage in an assessment of the effects of gas flares in 
the Niger Delta region violated the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, 
                                                 
 50. Id. at 480. 
 51.  FED. R. CIV. P 11(b).  
 52.  See Gbemre, No. FHC/B/CS/53/2005 at 1(detailing Gbemre‘s complaints).  
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Cap. E12, Vol. 6, Sec 2(2), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
53
  The third 
argument was that the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, Cap. A25, Volume 
1, Section 3(2)(a)(b), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, which 
permits gas flaring, is inconsistent with Section 33(1) and 34(1) of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution; as such, the Re-Injection Act should be deemed 
void.
54




In November 2005, the High Court responded to this matter by issuing 
an injunction stopping Shell and other oil companies from engaging in gas-
flaring activities.  The High Court reasoned that gas flaring violated the 
constitutional rights to life and dignity of the people of the Niger Delta 
community.
56
  The Court also found that the gas-flaring laws were 
unconstitutional and void and thereby instructed the Attorney General as 
well as the Federal Executive Council to create new gas-flaring regulation 
that would pass constitutional muster.
57
  
Although this decision was a historic one, victory on the stoppage of 
gas flaring was only short lived, as Shell violated the court‘s order and 
continually engaged in flaring gas.
58
  Shell refused to comply with the 
court‘s order, arguing, inter alia, that the High Court failed to apply proper 
judicial procedure and Shell lacked adequate resources to liquefy gas 
flares.
59
  In December 2005, Mr. Gbemre filed suit against Shell on the 
grounds that Shell failed to comply with the court‘s order.
60
  Although 
Gbemre‘s contempt suit may be deemed premature given that the court 
                                                 
    53.  See id. at 2 (detailing the plaintiff‘s argument relating to the Environmental Impact 
Assessment).  
    54.  See id. (noting that gas flaring violates the Nigerian Constitution). 
 55.  See id. (discussing Gbemre‘s request for damages). 
 56.  See Gbemre, No. FHC/B/CS/53/2005 at 30 ("[T]he constitutionally granted 
fundamental rights to life and dignity of human person . . . inevitably includes the right to 
clean poison-free, pollution-free and healthy environment."). 
 57.  See id. at 31 ("[T]he provisions of sections 3(2)(a), (b) of the Associated Gas Re-
injection Act Cap, A25 Vol. 1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria . . . are therefore 
unconstitutional, null and void."). 
 58.  See Press Release, Climate Justice, Shell Fails to Obey Court Order to Stop 
Nigeria Flaring, Again, May 2, 2007,  
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/media/2007May2/ (last visited Nov. 16, 
2010) [hereinafter Climate Justice Press Release II] (reporting on Shell‘s failure to 
"immediately respect a court order to stop gas flaring in Nigeria" by April 30th, 2007) (on 
file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 59.  See Richard Black, Contempt Case for Shell Over Gas, BBC NEWS, Dec. 24, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4556662.stm (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) 
(reporting on the possibility of contempt of court proceedings against Shell for its failure to 
stop gas flaring as ordered by the Nigerian Federal Court) (on file with the Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).   
 60.  See Climate Justice Press Release II, supra note 58 (monitoring the Gbemre‘s 
subsequent actions after the November 2005 High Court‘s decision). 
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issued an injunction barely forty-five days earlier, the suit helped the 
plaintiff contribute to the discussion about ending gas flaring.   
However, Gbemre‘s lawsuit was not successful at fueling social 
change because the court was not able to administer the constitutional 
principle guiding the case after November 2005, the date the court issued an 
injunction to Shell.  After the Gbemre case was decided, the court failed to 
implement the constructional principle of its decision, "the rights to clean 
poison-free, pollution-free healthy environment."
61
  The court‘s inability to 
implement its decision is evidenced by the fact that in April 2006, the court 
released Shell of its obligation to stop flaring gas on the condition that Shell 
met the quarterly step-by-step reduction in gas flaring.
62
  By adopting a 
step-by-step approach, the goal was to end gas flaring by April 30, 2007.
63
  
However, the Nigerian court of appeals restrained the Gbemre court from 
sitting on May 31, 2006, the date set for personal appearances regarding 
Shell‘s step-by-step proposal to halt gas flaring.
64
  
Sadly, by April 30, 2007, Shell failed to present the quarterly step-by-
step gas-flaring reduction proposal and was still flaring gas.
65
  Between 
April 2006 and April 2007 Shell did not reduce the amount of gas flared.
66
  
Moreover, after Shell violated the orders and a contempt case was filed, the 
trial judge who originally heard the case was transferred to a different 
district and the case file was reported lost.
67
  Since then, no actions have 
been taken against Shell.  The Gbemre case events illustrate that the 
Gbemre case did not lead to any immediate social change, because after the 
trial judge ruled in favor of Gbemre, the court failed to implement the 
constitutional principle on which the case was grounded: the rights to 
pollution-free healthy environment.  
While the Gbemre case did not result in an immediate stoppage of gas 
flaring, it aroused discussion on Shell‘s gas-flaring practice in the 
international community.  Due to national and international pressures, the 
Nigerian government announced that by December 2007, all gas-flaring 
                                                 
 61.  See Gbemre, Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/2005 at 30 (stipulating that clean 
environment is a constitutional guaranteed right). 
    62.  See Climate Justice Press Release II, supra note 58 ("In April 2006 . . . [Shell] was 
granted a conditional stay of execution, releasing it from the duty to comply with a court 
order in November 2005 to stop flaring, on three conditions. One year on, two of these 
conditions have not been met."). 
     63. See id. (discussing the failure to comply with the court‘s order). 
     64. See id. ("[T]he Court of Appeal . . . ordered the . . .  [Federal High Court] not to sit 
on the day appointed for the personal appearances."). 
     65. See id. (observing that the April 30, 2007 deadline was not met). 
    66.  See id. ("[T]he judge . . . [was] removed from the case, transferred to the north of 
the country, and [for the second time] there . . . [were] problems with the court file."). 
     67.  See id. (reporting the transfer of the district judge to a different district).  
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activities must be halted.
68
  The deadline was later extended to January 1, 
2008, and then again to January 6, 2008.
69
  Indeed, the January 2008 
deadlines were not met and the Nigerian government did not penalize Shell 
for gas flaring.  During this time period, Kenule Saro-Wiwa Jr.‘s Alien Tort 
Action case against Shell was being heard by a Judge in the Southern 
District of New York.
70




Ironically, a foreign court, rather than a Nigerian court, was the first 
court to have a binding and implemented decision on the matter.  This 
settlement makes the Nigerian government appear unresponsive to 
environmental matters.  A few months after the Kenule Saro-Wiwa Jr. 
settlement, the legislature proposed another gas-flaring bill.
72
  The bill 
proposes to end gas flaring by December 2012.
73
  However, even though 
gas-flaring litigation pressured the Nigerian legislative branch to 
promulgate legislation to combat this hazard, gas-flaring orders and 
government deadlines appear to be rather symbolic than realistic.  The 
Nigerian government had continuously set deadlines to stop gas flaring 
since the 1960s; thus, this new deadline may only be an addition to the 
already failed deadlines. 
With the new gas-flaring deadline, the gas-flaring problem may have, 
yet again, only garnered a temporary political response.  The high-level 
deference toward Shell is likely to stall the process to end gas flaring.  
Moreover, when such deference is continuously conferred on an oil 
company, it is difficult to achieve social change because the government 
continually relies on the oil companies‘ stipulations.  For example, this 
protectionism of oil companies is evident in the Gbemre case, where the 
                                                 
     68. See Bassey, supra note 17, at 5 ("It was in response to local and international 
pressure that the Federal Government once more pledged to gas flares in Nigeria.").  
     69.  See id. (detailing the different deadlines that the Nigerian government set to stop 
gas flaring). 
    70.  See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW)(HBP), at 17–
32 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 2009), available at  
http://ccrjustice.org/files/3.16.09%205th%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf (alleging that the 
executions, imprisonment, and torture of various plaintiffs at the hands of the Nigerian 
military junta were carried out with Shell‘s knowledge, consent, and support). 
 71.  See Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co., No. 04 Civ. 2665, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 
2009), available at  
http://wiwavshell.org/documents/Wiwa_v_Shell_SETTLEMENT_AGREEMENT.Signed.pd
f (settling the case of Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. for $11,000,000.00). 
 72.  See Onwuka Nzeshi, Gas Flare Deadline Now December 2012, THIS DAY, Jan. 14, 
2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201001140228.html (last visited December 20, 2010) 
(reporting that the Nigerian "House of Representatives . . . perfected the legislative 
framework pegging the deadline for gas flaring in Nigeria‘s petroleum sector at December 
31, 2012") (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 73.  See id. (observing that the stoppage of gas flaring deadline has been postponed to 
December 2012). 
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trial judge was transferred to a different district a few months after ordering 
Shell to stop flaring gas.
74
  In fact, the judge was transferred after Shell‘s 
numerous attempts to stay the proceedings.
75
  
Withstanding these impediments, Niger Delta citizens continue to 
discuss the need to stop gas flaring.
76
  Although such gas-flaring litigation 
instigates discussion on the issue among community members, such 
discussion is only short lived among cabinet members because of their 
stance of protectionism toward oil companies.
77
  With such clouded vision, 
the government influences the judicial branch, as will be discussed in Part 
IV (B).  Consequently, the court either succumbs to the government‘s 
wishes in protecting Shell or tactfully declines to take further action in the 
case.
78
  However, social change cannot be achieved when a court is 
unwilling to deviate from the status quo.  In sum, while the Gbemre case 
contributed to the ongoing dialogue on gas flaring, the goal of using the 
court as a forum for protest and social change cannot truly be achieved 
when a governmental system is plagued by undue influence from the 
executive branch.  
                                                 
 74.  See Climate Justice Press Release II, supra note 58 (discussing the subsequent 
transfer of the Judge assigned to the Gbemre case).  
 75.  See id. (noting that Shell wanted the district court to stay proceedings until the 
Court of Appeals decided whether the district court has jurisdiction over the matter). 
 76.  See Poison Fire, supra note 12 (following "a team of local activists as they gather 
‗video testimonies‘ from communities on the impact of oil spills and gas flaring" in the 
Niger Delta). 
 77.  See Emmanuel Aziken, Inalegwu Shaibu & Leon Usigbe, Nigeria: Senate’s Public 
Hearing on Gas Flaring Begins, VANGUARD, Nov. 25, 2008,  
http://allafrica.com/stories/200811250120.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (reporting on a 
public hearing in the Nigerian Senate on the Gas Flaring Prohibition and Punishment Bill 
prescribing a December 2008 deadline for the prohibition of gas flaring in the Niger Delta) 
(on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). The Senate announced 
that gas flaring must stop by December 31, 2010.  See Sufuyan Ojeiifo, Gas Flaring Must 
End By December 2010, THIS DAY, May 15, 2009, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200905150189.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (reporting on the 
passage of the Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2009, giving oil companies a 
December 31, 2010 deadline to end gas flaring in the Niger Delta) (on file with the Journal 
of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  However, the federal government did not 
allocate the necessary funding in its budget to stop gas flaring.  See Charles Okonji, FG 
Dumps Zero Gas Flare Agenda, NIGERIAN COMPASS, Jan. 5, 2010,  
http://www.compassnews.net/Ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37822:f
g-dumps-zero-gas-flare-agenda&catid=111:energy&Itemid=712 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) 
(saying that the Nigerian federal government did not budget for strategies aimed at stopping 
gas flaring in the Niger Delta in 2010) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment).  
 78.  See Gbemre, No. FHC/B/CS/53/2005 at 29–30 (holding that the Nigerian 
Constitutional right to life includes the right to a clean, pollution free environment, and that 
Shell‘s failure to halt gas flares violates said right). 
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IV. Theoretical Framework 
 
In addition to using the courts as a forum for social change to stop gas 
flaring in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta, Nigerian plaintiffs have explored litigation 
in the courts as a "forum for protest."  Discussion of the role of litigation in 
stopping gas flaring in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta is important as it illustrates the 
possible role, limitation, and impediments of the Nigerian court in stopping 
gas flaring.  Additionally, the analysis of litigation in stopping gas flaring is 
important given that a Federal Court in Port Harcourt dismissed a similar 
gas-flaring case that had identical claims to the Gbemre case.
79
  As such, 
Part A will analyze the use of litigation as a tool to stop gas flaring in the 
Niger Delta region and concludes that litigation has not be an effective tool 
in combating gas flaring. Part B builds on the concept of the rule of law and 
the importance of the rule of law in gas-flaring litigation.  This part 
concludes that if Nigerian courts fail to abide by the principle of the rule of 
law, the court will be unable to serve as an independent arbitrator and will 
not be able to ensure that gas-flaring deadlines are met.  
A. Litigation as a Tool to Stop Gas Flaring? 
 
Some scholars have argued that litigation is an effective tool to combat 
environmental degradation and climate change.
80
  Professor Hari Osofsky 
concluded, "the cross-cutting nature of climate change makes this litigation 
an important mechanism for spurring and fine-tuning governmental and 
corporate efforts."
81
  Climate-change litigation has been a successful tool in 
bringing about environmental justice in countries such as the United 
States.
82
  In assessing the success of climate-change litigation, Professor 
                                                 
 79.  See Barr Ikechukwu Opkara v. Shell, [2005] No. FHC/PH/CS/518/05, at 23 
(F.H.C.) (Nigeria), available at  
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/gasflares/22092006 (dismissing the suit 
because the plaintiffs—four Niger Delta communities—did not rely on explicit rights of the 
Nigerian constitution). 
 80.  See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralistic Legal 
Dialogue?, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 181, 182 (2007) (discussing the conceptualization of 
climate change litigation as a pluralist legal dialogue, and arguing "for a less extreme version 
of hybridization that still hews true to the legal pluralist literature").  
 81.  See Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation, 
CLIMATE LAW 5 (2010), available at  
http://iospress.metapress.com/content/23746166q74620p2/fulltext.pdf  
(analyzing "the ongoing role of climate change litigation as part of transnational efforts to 
address the problem" and considering the implications of applying "a taxonomy of diagonal 
regulatory approaches to two examples of climate change litigation stemming from the US 
Clean Air Act"). 
     82.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504–35 (2007) (reversing the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit‘s decision upholding the EPA's refusal to 
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Osofsky discussed the "formal successes" of climate-change litigation as 
well as its "informal success."
83
  Professor Osofsky noted, "the attention 
that these [climate change] cases receive pressure policymakers to address . 
. . [the climate change] problem and draws attention to the plight of 
vulnerable populations and ecosystems."
84
  Furthermore, "[b]oth formally 
successful suits and those with little hope of achieving binding results have 
together helped to change the regulatory landscape at multiple levels of 
government by putting both legal and moral pressure on a wide range of 
individuals and entities to act."
85
  Thus, Professor Osofsky posited that 
success in climate-change litigation goes beyond the court‘s judgment as it 




However, as is evident in Nigeria, environmental-law litigation, 
masked under human-rights litigation, has not been informally successful 
and is not likely to be informally successful until Nigeria adopts good 
governance: a type of governance that encapsulates the elements of the rule 
of law.  Indeed, gas-flaring adjudication has raised public awareness, but 
the awareness raised may not amount to informal success given that gas 
flaring litigation has not pressured policymakers to ensure that gas-flaring 
practices end.  The Nigerian government has been under pressure from both 
local and international communities to stop gas flaring over the past 16 
years; however, the Nigerian government has not implemented a plan to 
stop gas flaring.
87
  But during this time period the government has been 
very good at delivering empty promises to stop gas flaring.  
Litigation in Nigerian courts cannot be an effective tool to stop gas 
flaring when the courts violate the rule of law.  As exemplified in the 
Kenule Saro-Wiwa case, Nigerian courts have been highly influenced by 
the executive branch, in violation of the principle of the rule of law.  
However, litigation cannot stop gas flaring when the executive branch 
influences the courts because the courts will only dictate outcomes 
commensurate with the executive branch‘s orders.  Litigation in Nigeria 
will only generate results that are favorable to the executive, a clear 
violation of the spirit of the rule of law.  When the court‘s holding 
                                                                                                                 
engage in rulemaking with regard to global climate change under the Clean Air Act because 
the Act did not authorize the EPA to address global climate change). 
    83.  See Osofsky, supra note 81, at 9–29 (noting how climate change litigation, 
successful or not, can be instrumental in changing regulation).  
 84.  See id. at 8–9 (observing  the effects of litigation on climate change regulation).  
 85.  See id. at 9 (noting how climate change litigation, successful or not, can be 
instrumental in changing regulation). 
    86.  See id. at 9–10 (describing the informal success of climate change litigation).  
 87.  See Boycott Shell/Free Nigeria:  The Main Issues, Shell in Nigeria:  What are the 
Issues?, http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/issues.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010)  
(summarizing alleged  transgressions by Shell in Nigeria and advocating a boycott of the 
company) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
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coincides with the executive branch‘s political agenda, the likelihood that 
gas flaring litigation puts pressure on policymakers diminishes.  Nigerian 
policymakers are not necessarily pressured by such gas-flaring litigation 
because; (1) these policymakers have long been aware of the gas-flaring 
issue and have been reluctant to address the issue; (2) corruption inundates 
the Nigerian political system and a citizen‘s attempt to pressure 
policymakers is likely to be met with brutal punishment. Indeed, continuous 
gas-flaring litigation, scrutiny from international organizations, and 
pressure from foreign countries may help persuade the Nigerian courts to 
abide by the rule of law principle.  
 Part B therefore further builds on the concept of the rule of law and 
how it applies to Nigeria.  It concludes that in gas-flaring litigation matters, 
the Nigerian courts are not bound by the principle of the rule of law and 
that the rule of law is a prerequisite for litigation to be an effective tool to 
stop gas flaring.   
 
B. The Rule of Law 
 
In Nigeria, in cases involving oil companies such as Shell, the concept 
of the rule of law is a mere idealization.  A major impediment to stopping 
gas flares and the environmental hazards lies in the fact that Nigeria has 
adopted a rule by corporation approach rather than a rule of law approach.  
Although various scholars have postulated theoretical meanings to the rule 
of law, a common consensus is that a legal system guided by the rule of law 
must inter alia, ensure that the laws are previously announced, that the legal 




One of the most important elements of the rule of law is restraint of 
tyranny.  In fact, "rule of law means freedom from arbitrary and tyrannical 
governance through restraints on state power."
89
  In contrast, rule by 
corporation could be defined as corporations, such as oil corporations, 
influencing the government and the government subsequently influencing 
the courts.  In a rule-by-corporation approach, oil companies simply ignore 
                                                 
 88.  See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 209–10 (rev. ed. 1969) (stating 
the prerequisites for rule of law); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in The 
Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 214–17 (2d ed. 2009) (giving some 
principles that can be derived from the basic idea of the rule of law including the principles 
that laws should be relatively stable, that the law should be relatively open and clear, and 
that the judiciary must be independent); Lawrence B. Solum, A Law of Rules: A Critique and 
Reconstruction of Justice Scalia’s View of the Rule of Law, APA NEWSLETTERS 16 (2002), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=303575 (explaining A. V. Dicey‘s views on the 
Rule of Law). 
 89.  Erik Luna, Wither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic & Social Development 
Part II of II, 14 TRANSNAT‘L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 529, 584 (2004).   
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regulations or court orders that are not favorable to them, without fear of 
being sanctioned.  In fact, in Nigeria, oil companies are minimally 
sanctioned.  In other words, the oil companies are granted impunity.  
In matters concerning environmental issues and Shell, the Nigerian 
courts fail to be free of "arbitrary and tyrannical government" in that the 
executive branch, in collaboration with Shell, controls the legal system.  
This phenomenon was exemplified in the Kenule Saro-Wiwa case in which 
the executive branch issued carte blanche to the judiciary to punish 
indigents who were deemed traitors to the oil industry.
90
  Although the 
Kenule Saro-Wiwa case was under a different government, it warrants 
discussion because it depicts the pattern and culture of how the executive 
branch effectively influences the judiciary.  Comparing the facts of the 
Kenule Saro-Wiwa case to the Gbemre case also reinforces the theme of a 
highly influenced judiciary in environmental-litigation cases. 
Kenule Saro-Wiwa, an indigenous person and human-rights activist 
who also denounced the inhumane use of law to achieve a political agenda 
and environmental degradation, was met with death by hanging.
91
  Using a 
sham charge, the Nigerian government imprisoned Kenule Saro-Wiwa.  It 
was alleged that Kenule Saro-Wiwa was responsible for the death of four 
Ogoni chiefs at a meeting that he in fact did not attend, despite the fact that 
the government was unable to establish any connection between the alleged 
murder and Kenule Saro-Wiwa.
92
  The military dictator, Sani Abacha, 
appointed a military tribunal consisting of military personnel who belonged 
to the executive branch of government to preside over the case after he 
determined that Kenule Saro-Wiwa was involved in "civil disobedience."
93
  
The military-tribunal personnel were also members of the executive branch 
of government that authored the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) 
Decree, No. 2 of 1987, the Decree that governed Kenule Saro-Wiwa‘s 
                                                 
 90.  See Muchelle Morum & Lucy Finlayson, In Prison with Ken Saro-Wiwa, 
http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/iarticles/in_prison_with_ken_saro.htm (last visited April 
7, 2010) (detailing a public talk given by Ledum Anazur Mitee, a Nigerian activist from 
"one of the sites for oil exploitation in the Niger delta," who was a cellmate of Ken Saro-
Wiwa before his execution) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 90.  See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW)(HBP), at 8–
10 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 2009), available at  
http://ccrjustice.org/files/3.16.09%205th%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf (alleging that the 
executions, imprisonment, and torture of various plaintiffs at the hands of the Nigerian 
military junta were carried out with Shell‘s knowledge, consent, and support). 
 92.  See The Case Against Shell, http://wiwavshell.org/the-case-against-shell/ (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2010) (summarizing the events surrounding the execution of Ken Saro-
Wiwa, Shell‘s alleged liability, and the legal action against Shell being pursued by the 
Center for Constitutional Rights and Earth Rights International) (on file with the Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 93.  Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree, No. 2 of 1987 § 1(1)(a)–(d). 





In the Kenule Saro-Wiwa case, the executive and legislative branches 
merged.  The executive branch was influenced by the thirst for profits from 
Shell.  The indigenous people observed military personnel being 
transported in Shell‘s vans to the Niger Delta region. Consequently, Kenule 
Saro-Wiwa was sentenced to death by hanging, an unlikely consequence for 
being an environmental-rights advocate.  Moreover, at the time Kenule 
Saro-Wiwa was convicted, there were no laws criminalizing environmental-
rights advocacy.  If the rule of law means anything, it "means that 
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed . . . which make it 
possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive 
powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the 
basis of this knowledge."
95
  The Kenule Saro-Wiwa case exemplifies 
arbitrary rulings in environmental matters and illustrates the judiciary‘s 
failure to respect the concept of the rule of law.  
With the ascension of the current democratic government, one could 
argue that the Nigerian courts are now purged from arbitrary rulings and the 
oil companies‘ undue influence.  However, such an argument is misplaced.  
The oil companies‘ undue influence was illustrated in the Gbemre case 
discussed in Part III (B), in which the trial judge was transferred and the 
case file reported lost a few months after the judge ordered Shell to stop 
flaring gas.
96
  The missing case file and the judge‘s transfer may appear to 
be a mere coincidence; however, one familiar with the Nigerian justice 
system may not be surprised by these sudden events.
97
  The question then 
becomes whether these actions were intentionally taken to impede the 
proceeding and whether the Gbemre case was deemed to be a threat to the 
status quo.  
                                                 
 94.  See International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria, 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 
161/97, African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, Oct. 31, 1998, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b6123.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (holding 
that, with regard to the imprisonment and execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, "there has been a 
violation of Articles 9.2, 10.1 and 11, 26, 16 . . . [and] that in ignoring its obligations to 
institute provisional measures, Nigeria has violated Article 1 [of the African Charter]") (on 
file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 95.  F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80 (50th anniversary ed., U, of Chicago Press 
1994). 
 96.  See Climate Justice Press Release II, supra note 58 (detailing the subsequent 
events after the case was heard by the Federal High Court).  
 97.  See Press Release, Friends of the Earth, Shell Fails to Obey Gas Flaring Court 
Order, May 2, 2007, 
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/shell_fails_to_obey_gas_fl_02052007.html 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (reporting on Shell‘s failure to comply with a Federal High 
Court of Nigeria order that it "submit a detailed plan of action on how gas flaring would be 
stopped by 30 April 2007") (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
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It could be inferred that the judge was transferred to halt the Gbemre 
case.  This inference is also supported by the fact that after the judge was 
transferred and the case file was reported lost, Gbemre was arrested and 
detained by Nigerian soldiers.
98
  The soldiers who arrested Gbemre are the 
same soldiers who guard the gas-flaring sites—members of the Nigerian 
Armed Forces.
99
  Indeed, it appears that Gbemre‘s arrest bears no 
relationship to the problems of the judiciary; however, it is the same 
military that interfered with the Kenule Saro-Wiwa case.  Moreover, in the 
Gbemre case, as in the Kenule Saro-Wiwa case,
100
 Gbemre was arrested 
during a community interactive forum discussing the impact of gas 
flaring.
101
  As such, Gbemre‘s arrest suggests that the judge‘s transfer and 
the missing case file were not a mere coincidence.  The government went 
beyond silencing the court by transferring the judge, to attempting to 
silence Gbemre. Gbemre‘s arrest was an action geared to instill fear in him.  
The Gbemre and Kenule Saro-Wiwa cases illustrate the military‘s modus 
operandi.  In environmental-law cases, the military continues to influence 
the courts.  Although, the military‘s actions in gas-flaring cases under the 
current government are not as brutal as their actions were under Sani 
Abacha‘s regime when the Kenule Saro-Wiwa case was decided, the 
military continues to punish citizens who oppose gas flaring.  For example, 
in May 2009, Amnesty International reported that:  
 
[T]he Nigerian military continues to carry out attacks by land, air 
and sea on the oil-rich Niger Delta.  Reports indicate hundreds, 
possibly thousands, of Nigerian civilians may be dead.  Entire 
villages have reportedly been burned to the ground . . . [recent 
occurrences such as this have] received little international 
attention.  Aid groups and journalists have been blocked from 
                                                 
 98.  See Press Release, Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth, Nigeria, 
ERA Flays Arrest of Activists, Journalists, Sept. 2, 2008,  
 http://www.eraction.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=132&Itemid=1 
(last visited January 12, 2011) [hereinafter Environmental Rights] (condemning the arrest 
and detention of Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth, Nigeria personnel "by 
soldiers guarding gas flaring sites operated by Shell" while noting that the Nigerian military 
acts in collaboration or under the orders of the Nigerian government) (on file with the 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 99.  See id. (observing Gbemre‘s activities after the November 2005 judgment). 
 100.  See Shell: Guilty of Human Rights Abuses, 
http://www.shellguilty.com/learn-more/human-rights-abuses/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) 
(laying out a timeline of Shell‘s alleged role in Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria) (on file 
with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 101.  See Environmental Rights, supra note 98 (noting the hostility towards Gbemre 
after his case was heard by the Federal High Court). 
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The military acknowledged these recent attacks but claimed that the 




The report mentioned above illustrates how the current democratic 
government has minimized the publicity of the ongoing harassment in the 
Niger Delta region.  The current military attacks are similar to the 
Ogoniland events in the mid 1990s when the military raided Ogoniland, 
burned down houses, and killed Ogoni citizens under the pretext of "peace-
keeping efforts."
104
  Thus, despite the new democratic government, the 
government remains resistant to environmental-rights activism.  Given the 
similarities between the Sani Abacha regime and the current regime, 
Nigeria‘s current legal system may not be accountable to environmental 
issues such as gas flaring, because "a legal strategy for holding government 
accountable . . . should invoke the power of the judiciary as an enforcement 
arm of government."
105
  Thus, unless the Nigerian government and 
judiciary are delivered from the influence of oil corporations such as Shell, 
the goal to end gas flaring in the Niger Delta region may be mere fantasy. 
Furthermore, for gas-flaring-related litigation to help stop gas flaring, 
there must be environmental laws or statutes to give guidance to the 
judiciary, and such legal principles must be moral.  Ronald Dworkin argues 
that the rule of law "requires that the rules in the rule book capture and 
enforce moral rights."
106
  It is imperative to note that what may be deemed 
moral right depends on the unique society.  In other words, laws that govern 
                                                 
 102.   See Juan Gonzalez, Massive Casualties Feared in Nigerian Military Attack on 
Niger Delta Villages, DEMOCRACY NOW!, May 21, 2009,  
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/5/21/nigeria (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) (reporting on a 
Nigerian military offensive in the Niger Delta and the possible resultant death toll ―in the 
hundreds, maybe thousands.‖) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment).  
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See Human Rights Watch, The Ogoni Crisis:  A Case-Study of Military Repression 
in Southeastern Nigeria, July 1,1995, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a7d8c.html 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (detailing military oppression in Nigeria related to Shell‘s oil 
interests in the Niger Delta, and making recommendations on how to correct the problem to 
the government of Nigeria) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 105.  See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE READER 99–126 (W.H. Rodgers, Jr. & M. Robinson-Dorn eds. 2009) available at 
http://www.law.uoregon.edu/faculty/mwood/docs/atmo.pdf (proposing "an organizing legal 
framework based on the public trust doctrine to define government responsibility in climate 
crisis . . . impos[ing] a fundamental limitation on the power of government over natural 
resources," and assigning government "the fiduciary obligation to protect such resources for 
present and future generations"). 
 106.  RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 12 (Oxford U. Press 1985).  
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must collectively reflect the conscience of the people.  Laws that reflect the 
conscience of the people are laws that are easier to understand and may 
make implementation easier.  Such morality in law implies that the 
government has a fiduciary duty to safeguard the people‘s fundamental 
rights by protecting them from environmental hazards.
107
 
Although Gbemre‘s claim was grounded in a constitutional principle, 
the court noted it was problematic that the laws governing gas flares were 
outdated.
108
  The lack of an applicable gas-flaring law cripples judicial 
review because the judiciary lacks relevant guidance when reviewing gas-
flaring matters.  Consequently, the courts struck down the outdated gas-
flaring laws and instructed the legislative branch to enact new laws.
109
  In 
accordance with the judiciary‘s recommendation, a new bill was passed.  
However, the ambiguity of provisions resulted in a public outcry. The bill 
stipulates in part: 
 
Any person who flares gas after the 31st day of December, 2010 
contrary to Section 1(2) of this Act, commits an offence under 
this Act, and shall be liable to conviction and pay a penalty which 
shall be equal to the cost of the volume of gas flared at the 




Although the creation of the new bill is laudable, some legal 
professionals have criticized the bill, arguing that it is a sham that will 
only allow oil companies to continue their gas-flaring practices.
111
  The 
major concern is that the language of the bill is too vague.  It fails to 
stipulate what the cost of gas really means, thus resulting in difficulty in 
determining the amount of penalty to be stipulated.  This vagueness may 
                                                 
    107.  See Wood, supra note 105, at 100 ("Atmospheric trust litigation is premised on the 
generic and inherent fiduciary obligation of all governments to protect a shared atmosphere 
that is vital to human welfare and survival."). 
 108.  See Gbemre, No. FHC/B/CS/53/2005 at 30 (ordering the promulgation of a new 
gas flaring law). 
 109.  See id. (finding that the gas flaring laws at the time of the Gbemre litigation were 
outdated). 
 110.  See Bamidele Aturu, Prohibitation of Gas Flaring Bill 2009:  From Lamentation 
to Action? A Presentation at the Forum on Gas Flaring 2, available at   
http://www.saction.org/home/saction_image/ATURUS%20PAPER%20ON%20GAS%20FL
ARING.pdf (summarizing the provisions of the Prohibition of Gas Flaring Bill 2009 and 
examining said provisions "to see whether or not they would meet the concerns raised by 
communities and organizations as to the devastating and deleterious effects of mindless 
flaring of gas in Nigeria"). 
 111.   See Jide Ogundana, Too Many Bumps on a Level-Playing Field,  
http://www.iflr1000.com/LegislationGuide/225/Too-many-bumps-on-a-level-playing-
field.html (last visited April 1, 2010) (reviewing the Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill, and 
attempting "to ascertain what it portends for investment in Nigeria") (on file with the Journal 
of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
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lead to arbitrary penalty or no penalty.  In other words, if such a bill is 
passed into law, it may lead to inconsistency in gas-flaring litigation, 
which may only fuel arbitrariness in the judicial system and deprive 
citizens of the ability to predict the consequences of certain political 
actions.
112
  Thus, "the principal object of [the] government [in the gas 
flaring issue must be to give oil corporations clear and precise] . . . rules 
by which to shape [its] conduct."
113
  If the rules are not clear and precise, 
then oil companies will continually find weakness or exceptions in 
legislation, thereby allowing them to continue flaring gas under the color 
of law.  
These criticisms by legal professionals are important because it is the 
legal professionals who are responsible for litigating issues pertaining to 
the bill in the court.  Moreover, the legal professionals are more educated 
and knowledgeable than both the average citizen and the government 
about how the Nigerian court system works.  Hence, these legal 
professionals‘ criticisms suggest that the new bill will not help stop gas 
flaring and the new 2012 proposed deadline is a mere illusion.   
Given the government‘s numerous failed promises to stop gas flaring 
and the Nigerian court‘s inability to serve as a neutral arbitrator, the next 
section of this paper explores an alternative approach to combat the gas 
flaring issue in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta region.   
V. Alternative Approach 
 
This part suggests customary arbitration as an alternative to litigation.  
A customary-arbitration approach is significantly different from litigation 
because it minimizes the government‘s role in the litigation process.  
Because the government is highly influenced by Shell, a customary-
arbitration process would consequently limit Shell‘s influence in impeding 
the stoppage of gas flaring.  This proposed approach also minimizes gas-
flaring litigation in the Nigerian courts, which are highly permeated by 
Shell‘s influence.  Hence, the customary-arbitration approach would 
minimize Shell‘s influence in the gas-flaring decision-making processes.  
Part A defines community arbitration and discusses its historical roots.  Part 
B discusses the application of the customary-arbitration model to gas-
flaring matters.  Part C highlights the prerequisite to adopting the 
customary-arbitration method in combating gas flaring.  Part D discusses 
the benefits and drawbacks of the customary approach.  This section 
concludes that customary arbitration may be a more effective tool in 
stopping gas flaring because community arbitrators are free from Shell‘s 
                                                 
   112.  See FULLER, supra note 88, at 214–17 (stating that rule of law requires that citizens 
to be able to predict political actions). 
 113.  Id. 




A. What Is Community Arbitration? 
 
Customary arbitration has been practiced in Nigeria since colonial 
rule.  It has been recognized under Nigerian law and has been historically 
used in land and domestic dispute matters.
114
 The Nigerian Supreme court 
has defined customary arbitration as "[a]ny system of law not being the 
common law and not being a law enacted by any competent legislature in 
Nigeria but enforceable and binding within Nigeria as between both subject 
to its sway."
115
  The customary-arbitration model is grounded in the 
hierarchical culture embedded in Nigerian communities.  As Dr. Taslim 
Olawale Elias observed:  "it is well accepted that one of the many African 
customary modes of settling disputes is to refer the dispute to the head of 
the family or an elder or elders of the community."
116
  Thus, in a 
customary-arbitration approach, the judges are community members and 
the venue for the arbitration is the local community.
117
  
The goal of customary arbitration is "reconciliation, peace and 
assuagement of feelings that might otherwise dislocate social cohesion and 
solidarity."
118
  Although Nigeria‘s customary arbitration is not codified, the 
participants in customary-arbitration processes have generally adhered to 
the arbitrator‘s resolution.
119
  Customary arbitration produces binding 
resolution because prior to the commencement of the proceedings the 
parties often agree to abide by the arbitrator‘s decision.
120
  Indeed, the 
                                                 
 114.  See AMAZU A. ASOUZU, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN 
STATES: PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 116–175 (2001) 
(focusing on whether arbitration and ADR methods can contribute to the aspirations and 
needs of African states and their nationals, while at the same time satisfying the expectations 
of international investors and traders for profit, security and stability, and ensuring fairness 
and justice to both parties). 
 115.  Oluwafemi Oladipo, Where Does Islamic Arbitration Fit into the Judiciary 
Recognized Ingredients of Customary Arbitration in the Nigeria Jurisprudence?, in 8 AFR. J. 
ON CONFLICT RESOL. 2, 106 (2008).  
 116.  TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 80 (3d 
impression 1972). 
 117.  Id. at 187–205 (describing the customary-arbitration approach). 
 118.  ASOUZU, supra note 114, at 117.  
 119.  Id. at 118 (indicating that no African country has a statutory provision for 
customary arbitration, except for the proposed Arbitration Act of Ghana 2000).   
 120.  See S. Breckenridge Thomas, The American Review of International Arbitration, 
17 AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. 183, 184 (2006) (considering "the approach to international 
arbitration taken by four countries—China, Mexico, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia . . . [and] 
provid[ing] the reader with a current status of the countries' economies, the historical 
development of alternate dispute resolution, and pertinent laws governing the treatment of 
international arbitration").  
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parties involved in the arbitration voluntarily participate in the process.
121
  
For cases in which the parties do not submit to the decision of the 
arbitrators, the parties can appeal to the Nigerian courts.
122
  Building on this 
framework, the next part discusses the use of customary arbitration as a tool 
to stop gas flaring.  
B. Applying Customary Arbitration to Gas Flaring. 
 
Although customary arbitration is common throughout Africa, it has 
not been used as a tool to stop gas flaring.  Community representatives 
should be allowed to serve as arbitrators in gas-flaring matters as well as 
promulgate gas-flaring laws.  Customary arbitration is likely to be an 
effective solution to stopping gas flaring, given that the customary-
arbitration method has been able "to administer justice where the formal 
state justice system is inadequate, or perceived as illegitimate."
123
  The 
customary-arbitration model should be applied to the gas-flaring issue 
because "[t]he logic of customary law focuses on the well-being of the 
community, rather than the rights of the individual.  In practice this means 
that customary legal decisions tend to be compromises rather than clear 
decisions for one party against another."
124
  Consequently, the customary-
arbitration approach will focus on the unique needs of the Niger Delta 
community, while also balancing Shell‘s alleged financial restraint in 
implementing a scheme to stop flaring gas.  The unique needs of Niger 




C. The Prerequisite to the Customary Arbitration Method 
 
As stated in Part V(A), to ensure that the decision of the customary-
                                                 
 121.  See Oladipo, supra note 115, at 115 ("Voluntary submission is the basis of 
arbitration and it is universal to the concept of arbitration under all legal systems."). 
 122.  See Thomas, supra note 120, at 198 (noting that the parties in an arbitration have 
the "freedom to appeal" when a decision is unfavorable). 
 123.  Brynna Connolly, Non-State Systems and the State: Proposals for Recognition 
Typology, 38 CONN. L. REV. 239, 242 (2005). 
 124.  Elfin Henrysson & Sandra E Joireman, On the Edge of Law:  Women’s Property 
Rights and Dispute Resolution in Kissi, Kenya, 43 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 39, 41 (2009). 
 125. See Friends of the Earth Int'l, Stop Gas Flaring in Nigeria:  Call on Shell’s New 
CEO to Comply with Nigerian Law and Stop Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta, 
http://www.foei.org/en/get-involved/take-action/stop-flaring (last visited April 7, 2010) 
(discussing Friends of the Earth International‘s "cyberaction against the government of 
Nigeria urging them to put a stop to the illegal and harmful practice of gas flaring," and 
asking visitors to "sign our petition to urge the Shell CEO to [ . . . ] end gas flaring in 
Nigeria once and for all") (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
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arbitration panel is binding, the parties must voluntarily participate in the 
process.  Thus, if a customary arbitration approach is adopted, Shell may 
not be willing to submit to the process, and even if Shell participates, Shell 
will probably appeal the customary arbitrators‘ decision to the Nigerian 
courts.  To encourage Shell to participate in the process of community 
arbitration, the Niger Delta community could stipulate that Shell would 
only be permitted to drill crude oil if it is willing to work with the 
community to stop gas flaring.  This approach sounds harsh; however, 
given the fact that over the past several years Shell has failed to adhere to 
any gas-flaring deadlines, such a harsh stipulation may be the only way to 
get Shell‘s compliance.  It is arguable that such a harsh stipulation may not 
stop gas flaring, given that after Shell "was hit by a storm of protests by 
locals over its operations in [Ogoniland in 1993],"
126
 Shell ceased oil 
production in the land and has not made any attempts to clean up the land 
or commence oil production in Ogoniland.
127
  Shell‘s failure to clean up or 
negotiate with the Ogoni people on possible reentry into the land, is 
couched in the fact that Shell has numerous alternative oil drilling sites in 
the Niger Delta region.
128
  Withstanding the fact that Shell was evicted from 
Ogoniland, Shell is still profiting from oil production in other Niger Delta 
communities.  Ogoniland was only one of Shell‘s numerous options.  Thus, 
for customary arbitration to help stop gas flaring, the Niger Delta 
communities must act in unison.  Acting together, the Niger Delta 
communities could present Shell with the option of implementing an 
effective scheme to end gas flaring or face the possibility of eviction.  
Consequently, Shell would be faced with the option of losing its Nigerian 
oil-production revenue if evicted due to non-compliance or taking measures 
to stop gas flaring.  Given the fact that Nigeria is one of the world‘s top oil 
producers and oil production is a very lucrative business,
129
 it is likely that 
Shell will opt for the latter option.  Thus, under customary-arbitration 
approach Shell would face penalties if it fails to stop flaring gas.  Hence, 
the customary approach will be able to accomplish what the Nigerian 
                                                 
 126. See Arien Stuyt & Spencer Swartz, Nigeria to Pull Shell Ogoni License, DOW 
JONES NEWSWIRES, Sept. 22, 2006, available at,   
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=36439 (reporting the Nigerian government‘s 
decision to "revoke Royal Dutch Shell PLC's . . . oil license in the country's Ogoniland"). 
   127. See id. ("Shell stopped operating in Ogoniland in 1993 . . . ‗[t]hey have no future 
plans for the license.‘"). 
 128.  See Comrade Sunny Ofehe, Environmental Pollution in the Niger Delta, Feb. 18, 
2010, http://www.nigerdeltacampaign.com/index.php/2010/02/environmental-pollution-in-
the-niger-delta/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) (discussing environmental pollution in the Niger 
Delta and calling on oil companies to identify environmental problems in the Niger Delta, 
prepare a plan to address the problems, restore the ecosystem, and adopt "poverty alleviation 
measures that will help win over the support and confidence of the Niger Delta people") (on 
file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 129. See OMEJE, supra note 3, at 31 (discussing the scale of Nigeria‘s oil production).  
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government and courts have failed to achieve—implementation of penalties 
for flaring gas. 
D. The Customary-Arbitration Approach in Practice 
 
A customary-arbitration approach would be faster at settling gas-
flaring disputes than the Nigerian Courts.  "[C]ustomary dispute resolution 
systems are praised for their accessibility, local knowledge, low cost, and 
speed when contrasted with national court systems and public law."
130
  
Customary arbitration is more efficient because community representatives 
are not inundated with as many cases as the Nigerian courts.
131
  Moreover, 
these community leaders are more experienced than the Nigerian courts in 
gas-flaring issues.  Most community members have lived in gas-flaring 
communities all their lives and are more educated on the fatal effects of gas 
flaring.
132
  Consequently, community representatives are more likely to 
arbitrate gas-flaring matters efficiently, given that they have suffered the 
detrimental effects of continuous gas flaring for decades. 
An advantage of the customary approach is that community 
representatives, primarily farmers, are more knowledgeable about the land 
and the importance of land preservation.
133
  A citizen of the Akala-Olu 
community emphasized the need to access the philosophy that the "earth 
recycles itself."
134
  Various members of the Niger Delta community, in a 
documentary interview, advocated the need to stop gas flaring.
135
  Due to 
this knowledge, customary arbitrators may act in the best interest of the 
environment.  In other words, community members have a greater interest 
in ensuring that gas flaring stops, in contrast to the Nigerian government‘s 
profit interests.  As discussed earlier, members of the community suffer 
from the heat and toxic gases of the gas flare, as "most of the flares are 
                                                 
 130.  Henrysson & Joireman, supra note 124, at 41. 
 131.  See Kayode Oladele, The Nigerian Lawyer and Abuses of Court Processes, Feb. 
28, 2010, http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/guest-articles/the-nigerian-lawyer-
and-abuse-of-court-process.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (detailing problems with the 
Nigerian justice system stemming from "the rise in the abuse of court process by lawyers 
and their clients even sometimes with the active connivance and participation of some 
unprincipled judges") (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 132.  See SARO-WIWA, supra note 21, at 78 (describing the effects of gas flaring in 
Ogoni land). 
 133.  See Ben Amunwa, Shell Must Clean Up its Act in Nigeria, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 4, 
2009, available at http://remembersarowiwa.com/guardian-comment-shell-must-clean-up-
its-act-in-nigeria/ (revealing some of the ugly details of the Shell oil spills case in The Hague 
and placing Shell‘s appalling environmental record under scrutiny). 
 134.  Poison Fire, supra note 12. 
 135.  See id. (documenting the reactions of the Niger Delta residents to gas flaring).  The 
sentiments expressed in the documentary are important because it allowed various Niger 
Delta citizens to express their opinion regarding gas flaring.   
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located in village land, some a few hundred meters from the houses."
136
  
However, government officials are rarely exposed to the immediate 
detrimental effects of gas flaring because they generally do not reside in the 
villages.  Moreover, the government is not likely to act in the best interest 
of the environment, given that it operates a joint venture with Shell.
137
  The 
government‘s favoritism toward Shell is illustrated in the testimony of an 
Oruma resident who testified that community member‘s objection to Shell‘s 
gas flaring has resulted in brutal treatment from the government.
138
  Thus, 
the government resists actions that interfere with Shell‘s profitable business 
of flaring gas.  Due to the joint venture, when Shell profits, the government 
profits, and vice-versa.  Thus, the government does not have any real 
incentive to stop gas flaring, whereas members of the Niger Delta 
community have a vested interest in stopping gas flaring.  
Moreover, the customary-arbitration approach is more flexible and 
would allow community leaders to modify the gas-flaring laws to fit the 
present needs of the community.
139
  The customary-arbitration system is not 
as bureaucratic as the Nigerian government‘s legislative process.  Given 
that community leaders work on a smaller scale, they would be faster at 
agreeing to gas-flaring legislation that will reflect community sentiments.  
While the customary-arbitration approach has numerous advantages, it 
also presents some concerns.  First, Niger Delta community members may 
be hostile to Shell during the arbitration process due to the environmental 
and human-rights injustices the Niger Delta citizens have suffered resulting 
from Shell‘s gas-flaring practices.  To minimize this problem, international-
organization representatives who have officers in the Niger Delta region, 
such as Friends of the Earth International, may be appointed to chaperone 
the customary arbitration process.  Secondly, while Niger Delta residents 
have the general goal to stop gas flaring, the specific communities may 
stipulate differing obligations to Shell during the process.  To counter this 
problem, the representatives from various Niger Delta communities would 
have to vote on standards to adopt and agree that such standards would be 
binding on their respective communities.  Third, a customary-arbitration 
may increase the Nigerian government‘s malicious treatment, in the form of 
military attacks and killings, in the Niger Delta communities and this may 
hinder a community‘s gas-flaring adjudication process.  However 
                                                 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  See OMEJE, supra note 3, at 33 (observing that the Nigerian government and Shell 
operates a joint venture). 
 138.  Poison Fire, supra note 12 (documenting the Niger Delta residents‘ testimonies of 
the harsh punishments they faced as a result of advocating for their rights to a pollution free 
environment).  
 139.  See DENNIS CAMPBELL & SUSAN COTTER, COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 132 (Kluwer Law Int'l 1996) (noting that a "distinctive feature of 
customary law is its characteristic flexibility"). 
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international pressure and sanctions may help halt such intentional 
government actions.  
In sum, while the customary-arbitration approach may not be perfect, 
it is a more efficient way of halting gas flaring because it minimizes the role 
of the government in the process and allows the Niger Delta residents—the 
people most affected by gas flaring—to participate in the process.  As 
discussed earlier, Niger Delta residents suffer fatal health ailments and have 
lost their means of livelihood, fishing and farming, as a result of gas flaring. 
On the other hand, the government benefits financially from gas flaring and 
stopping gas flares would reduce the Nigerian government‘s revenue, given 
that it is cheaper to flare gas than re-inject it.  Consequently, the Nigerian 
government does not necessarily have a vested interest in stopping gas 
flaring.  Thus, because the Niger Delta residents have a higher stake in 
putting an end to gas flaring, they are more likely to develop and implement 
a scheme to stop gas flaring.  Hence, the Nigerian government should be 
persuaded to permit the implementation of community promulgated gas-
flaring laws.  Allowing community members to serve as arbitrators may be 
an efficient and more effective way to stop gas flaring.  
VI. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the customary arbitration method is a possible solution 
to stopping gas flaring, a goal the Nigerian government has failed to 
achieve for more than 50 years.  However, if the customary-arbitration 
approach is not adopted, then oil companies will continue flaring gas until 
the courts are impartial and the rule of law becomes meaningful.  The 
courts must ensure that Shell adheres to court orders and complies with 
legislation.  However, Nigeria‘s current political climate raises serious 
doubt about whether the government has the willpower to cease favoritism 
towards Shell. Moreover, oil companies will only stop flaring gas when the 
Nigerian government provides them with an incentive to do so.  Such an 
incentive includes imposing a strict and high penalty for violation of gas-
flaring laws.  Thus, as long as the Nigerian government protects the oil 
companies, the oil companies will persist in gas flaring, and environmental 
degradation. 
